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· Mulii-Party Litigation-Venue Statutes
and Their Application
An injured seaman sued his employer in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover
damages for injuries suffered on board his employer's vessel. The
court granted the employer's motion to implead the United States
as a third party defendant. The employer claimed indemnity for
any damages the seaman recovered for injuries aggravated by
_treatment in a United States hospital. The seaman then moved
to amend his complaint to allege an action directly against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The United
States objected that venue in the Southern District was improper
under the act which provided that "Any civil action on a tort
claim against the United States ... may be prosecuted only in the
judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or
omission complained of occurred." 1 The seaman resided in New
Jersey, and the alleged aggravation occurred in a hospital in the
Eastern District of New York. Held: Motion to amend granted.
The proposed amendment was not a "civil action" within the
meaning of the language quoted above. 2
The court was faced with another case3 presenting a conflict
between the clear language of a venue statute and the desirable
policy of settling all claims arising out of one transaction in a
single lawsuit, thus preventing inconsistent results as well as
saving time. In resolvihg that conflict in favor of consolidating
all law .s uits arisi;ng out Qf a single transaction in. one dist:dct; the
14
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2

Where
valid.
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lessee.

ra truck is operated with permission such liability 1s probably
See Moore v. Palmer, 350 Mich. 363, 86 N.W.2d 585 (1957),
the lessor wa:s driving h!s lea:sed truck as an employee of the
Noted in 11 VAND. L. REV. 911 (1958).

28 u.s.c. § 1402(b) (1948).
Ibid.

s Abramovitch v. United.States Lines, 174 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
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court refused to follow a prior decision by another judge in the
same district,4 and applied a strained and unusual interpretation
to the phrase "civil action." It is difficult to see why an ordinary
tort action by a seaman against the United States for damages
based upon the claim that hospital treatment aggravated injuries
previously sustained is not a "civil action."
When an original defendant impleads a third party defendant
a majority of courts hold that the third party action may proceed
in the federal court without any allegation, or proof, that independent federal jurisdictional grounds exist. 5 Also most have dispensed with the requirement that the third party action satisfy
the venue statutes. 6 The latter result has often been rested upon
the doubtful logic that since no independent federal jurisdictional
grounds must exist, the venue requirements are also not applicable.7 Without questioning the logic of the proposition that a
third party action is ancillary for venue purpose if it is ancillary
for jurisdiction, the proposition does not support the result in this
case. Federal courts have generally held that the original plaintiff
who seeks to amend his complaint to state a cause of action against
the third party defendant, after he has been impleaded, must
allege and prove independent federal jurisdictional grounds. 8 Thus
in the present case it is impossible to argue that independent venue
is not necessary because the suit is ancillary for jurisdiction.
Existing authorities are about evenly divided over whether
venue requirements must be met by a plaintiff who seeks to state
a cause of action against the third party defendant. The issue
has been decided differently by the district courts where it has
been presented. 9 The first edition of a leading treatise suggests
that venue requirements must be met, 10 whereas the second edition flatly states no objection to venue should be allowed. 11 AnHabina v. M.A. Henry Co., 8 F.R.D. 52 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
The cases are collected in 37 A.L.R.2d 1411, 1420 (1954).
6 Moncrief v. Pennsylvania R.R., 73 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; Morrell v. United States Air Lines Transp. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757 (S.D.
N.Y. 1939); United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709,714 (10th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954).
7 Ibid.
s The cases are collected in 37 A.L.R.2d 1411, 1430 (1954).
9 In contrast with the case under discussion, see Habina v. M. A. Henry
Co., supra note 3.
·
·
10 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14: 02, at 748 (1st ed. 1938).
11 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 1428.3, at 506 (2d ed. 1953).
4

11
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other authority, 12 without citing any support, argues that since
the plaintiff must show independent jurisdictional grounds to slie
the third party defendant, the venue requirements apply also.
Probably Congress passed the venue provision of the Federal
Tort Claims Act unaware of the issue presented by this case.
Therefore, it seems permissable to base a decision upon the general purposes of venue provisions. Venue requirements are· designed to select a forum which will not oppress the defendant, and
which will not be unfair to the plaintiff. In the instant case the
plaintiff chose the forum originally and does not object. The third
party defendant is before the court upon the complaint of the
third party plaintiff, and since the plaintiff's suit against the third
party defendant must arise ". . . out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against
the third party plaintiff," 13 allowance of the plaintiff's amended
complaint cannot work a hardship upon the third party defendant.
He is in court to litigate the impleaded action which will require
proving the same facts which will be relevant in the suit against
him by the original plaintiff.
It is true that if the plaintiff need not show proper venue for
his suit against the third party defendant, the plaintiff is permitted
to sue a person in a district which would have been improper
venue for a lawsuit against that person without the impleader.
If there is evidence to show that the plaintiff and the original
defendant have colluded and used the impleader action to make
possible the plaintiff's suit against the third party defendant which
but for the impleader would have been dismissed for improper
venue, then this should be grounds for requiring the plaintiff to
meet venue requirements. In the absence of evidence of collusion
between the plaintiff and the third party plaintiff, the result of
the instant case seems justified. 14
Charles Kimball, '62

12

71 HARV. L. REV. 877, 916 (1958).

13

FED. R. CIV. P. 14.

14

Exhaustive text material covering this area of the law may be found
in 71 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1958), especially £rom pages 910 to 913;
139 A.L.R. 919 (1942); 37 A.L.R.2d 1411 (1954).

